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A B S T R A C T
We explore why having a Social Licence to Operate (SLO) is essential for large projects. We analyse the Khudoni
Hydroelectric Power Plant in the Svaneti region of Georgia, which was halted in 2013 after much social protest.
We assess why the project lacked a SLO and what lessons can be learnt from this experience. Using the Thomson
and Boutilier model of SLO as our analytical framework, we elaborate its key elements – legitimacy, credibility
and trust – in the context of dam and hydropower projects and assess where the Khudoni project failed. We
conclude that the project lacked legitimacy, with local communities not seeing any social justiﬁcation for the
project. The credibility of the project and proponent was weak amongst the local population, and trust was
absent at all phases of the project. We conclude that the concept of social licence to operate has the potential to
encourage project proponents to consider and implement activities which will lead to better outcomes for all
parties. We believe there is a strong business case for companies to take the concept seriously. Improving social
performance will assist projects in gaining a social licence to operate and grow.
1. Introduction
The planning and construction of large infrastructure typically leads
to many social impacts (Vanclay, 2002; Vanclay et al., 2015; Esteves
et al., 2017). One signiﬁcant consequence (and cause of ongoing social
impacts) is involuntary resettlement, a ‘totalizing experience’ that can
be characterized as ‘one of the most acute expressions of powerlessness
because it constitutes a loss of control over one's physical space’ (Oliver-
Smith, 2002: 6). Much development-induced resettlement is due to the
construction of large dams (Scudder, 2005; Moore et al., 2010). Dam-
induced resettlement is especially problematic because of the number of
dams being constructed around the world, the vast scale of many of
these dams, and the large numbers of people aﬀected (Terminski,
2015). There is also much evidence that dam-induced resettlement
causes the impoverishment of displaced people (Cernea, 1997). Scudder
(2005, 2011), for example, examined 50 large dam projects and, in the
vast majority of cases, people were worse oﬀ as a result of being re-
settled. The World Commission on Dams (World Commission on Dams,
2000) concluded that dam projects have imposed an unfair burden on
large numbers of people, who typically have no say in decision making.
However, the WCD considered that this inequitable distribution of risks
and beneﬁts was avoidable. Nevertheless, international guidelines to-
gether with the national regulations in many countries around the
world are currently not adequate to ensure that the needs and interests
of aﬀected people are properly considered. A special issue of Water
Alternatives published 10 years after the WCD report resoundingly
concluded that little progress had been made and all the issues re-
mained (Moore et al., 2010). Clearly, mechanisms to address the many
complicated and sensitive issues that arise in resettlement have either
not been developed or are not eﬀectively implemented (McDonald-
Wilmsen and Webber, 2010; Vanclay, 2017a, 2017b).
Some writers have argued that the negative outcomes from dam-
induced resettlement need not and should not occur, and that there
needs to be a new paradigm about how resettlement is done and how
development projects are implemented (de Wet, 2001; Scudder, 2005;
Mathur, 2011; Perera, 2014; Vanclay, 2017a; Cernea and Maldonado,
2018). We argue that the concept of Social Licence to Operate (SLO)
can be the basis of this new paradigm. We illustrate this by using the
SLO concept to explain why the construction of a large Hydroelectric
Power Plant (HPP) in Georgia faltered. We advocate that, if the de-
velopers of HPPs and other large projects took the need to obtain a SLO
seriously (i.e. apply a new paradigm based around the need for SLO),
this would help them achieve better outcomes for aﬀected communities
and their projects.
Since coming into use in the late 1990s (Moore, 1996; Cooney,
2017), the concept of SLO has evolved, and is now much discussed in
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academia, industry and management circles (Prno, 2013; Boutilier,
2014; Jijelava and Vanclay, 2014a; Moﬀat and Zhang, 2014; Morrison,
2014; Parsons et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2015; Moﬀat et al., 2016; Smits
et al., 2017). Although there are various competing models (Zhang
et al., 2015, 2018; Lacey et al., 2017; Wright and Bice, 2017), and
notwithstanding that SLO is intended to be a metaphor (Prno and
Slocombe, 2012; Bice, 2014; Bice and Moﬀat, 2014), the basic idea is
that SLO is a continuum on which a number of levels can be identiﬁed,
for example: withheld, when there is no support for the project; accep-
tance, when local communities are not actively opposed to a project;
approval, when local communities view a project positively; and psy-
chological identiﬁcation, when local communities strongly support and
welcome a project (Thomson and Boutilier, 2011; Parsons and Moﬀat,
2014; Jijelava and Vanclay, 2017). SLO is often described as being an
implicit social contract between a project and its host communities
(Bice, 2014; Lacey and Lamont, 2014; Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016;
Lacey et al., 2016). Advocates of the concept argue that project pro-
ponents should incorporate SLO into their thinking and practice. Doing
so would help proponents achieve public approval for their activities,
and generate value for their business through all business drivers, such
as: improved reputation; revenue growth and access to markets; cost
savings and productivity; access to capital; improved risk management;
and access to human capital (Esteves and Vanclay, 2009; Esteves et al.,
2012; Vanclay et al., 2015). It would also contribute to minimising
harm to neighbouring communities. The main criticisms of the concept
are that it is vague, hard to measure, and that it is understood and used
diﬀerently by industry, academics, local communities and other sta-
keholders (Harvey and Bice, 2014; Moﬀat et al., 2016). SLO is also
considered by some to be a concept that has emerged only as a response
to community opposition to projects, and is used with the intention of
constraining debate on the underlying issues (Owen and Kemp, 2013;
Meesters and Behagel, 2017). Others consider that the lack of a SLO
does not necessarily mean that the project is not feasible and/or can not
proceed and thus it lacks power or agency (Owen, 2016; c.f. Ehrnstrom-
Fuentes and Kroger, 2017). Despite these criticisms, we consider that
the concept has much value, which we demonstrate in this paper.
We apply the concept of SLO to the Khudoni Hydroelectric Power
Plant in Georgia. This project originally commenced in the late 1970s,
but slowed to a stop in the late 1980s with the decline and eventual
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Planning recommenced in the
2000s, with an implementation agreement being signed with Trans
Electrica in 2009. However, the project was halted in 2013 due to
strong opposition from the local community. We use the model of SLO
developed by Thomson and Boutilier (2011) as our analytical frame-
work to consider what happened in the Khudoni HPP case. The
Thomson and Boutilier model provides a way to assess where the
Khudoni HPP project is positioned on the SLO continuum and to con-
sider what speciﬁc actions and circumstances led to this positioning. By
extrapolating from this case to other large projects, in our conclusion
we consider what should be done to make projects more acceptable to
local communities.
2. The Thomson & Boutilier model of social Licence to operate
Although there is a burgeoning literature on SLO, we base our un-
derstanding of SLO on the model developed by Thomson and Boutilier
(2011), which provides a holistic conceptual framework for under-
standing SLO. Although highly cited and a model with much appeal and
face validity, it has not been extensively tested. The Thomson and
Boutilier model was explicated further by Jijelava and Vanclay (2017),
who provided an operationalization of the model's underlying concepts,
legitimacy, credibility and trust. Thomson and Boutilier provided an
analytical framework in which SLO is conceived as a continuum (or
pyramid) with four levels (see Fig. 1). The bottom level is either where
SLO was never given (i.e. withheld) or where it was withdrawn. This lack
of SLO is evident where local communities openly criticise the project,
for example through one of the many forms of protest (Hanna et al.,
2016a). The acceptance level is achieved when a project convinces a
local community of its legitimacy. This includes not only legal and
administrative legitimacy, i.e. adherence to national legislation, but
also economic and social legitimacy, meaning that people should be
convinced that there will be adequate compensation and that sup-
porting the project is the right thing to do. The approval level requires
that projects gain credibility from a local community. Credibility is
achieved by the company providing true, clear and believable in-
formation, and delivering on commitments made. The highest level of
SLO is psychological identiﬁcation (or ‘ownership’ as in an earlier version
of the model). In order for a local community to identify with a project,
there must be a high level of trust, a strong relationship must have
developed between the project proponent and the local communities,
and they need to perceive each other as partners with shared interests.
Drawing on the explication provided by Jijelava and Vanclay (2017),
below we explore the three key factors underpinning SLO in the
Thomson and Boutilier model – legitimacy, credibility and trust – to the
Khudoni HPP in Georgia.
2.1. Legitimacy
For a project to achieve acceptance from the local community, its
legitimacy has to be established in legal/administrative, economic and
social terms. Legal/administrative legitimacy relates to the perception
by the local community that there is suﬃcient justiﬁcation for the
project (i.e. that it is needed) and that all relevant administrative pro-
cedures have been conducted in a fair and reasonable manner. This may
go beyond the requirements deﬁned in national law. Economic legiti-
macy means that the project must be justiﬁed in economic terms to the
local community, and that, for example, any compensation must be
adequate for the people being resettled. Social legitimacy relates to the
perceptions of local people on issues such as whether the project is good
for their wellbeing, whether it respects local ways of life, whether al-
ternatives have been fully explored and explained to the local com-
munity, whether aﬀected people have had a say and their views ade-
quately considered, and whether they feel they have been treated fairly
and reasonably. To ensure the legal/administrative legitimacy of SLO in
the eyes of local communities, project proponents should demonstrate
that they know of and have a good record of adhering to (and pre-
ferably exceeding) national and international standards. Where a pro-
ponent is a relatively unknown company, the local community will
likely have concerns about various issues and suspicions that their
rights will not be protected.
The economic legitimacy of large dams is largely related to the
Fig. 1. The Social Licence to Operate Continuum.
Source: Thomson and Boutilier (2011), used with permission.
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economic situation of the aﬀected people before and after the project
(Cernea, 2003). It is also related to the overall ﬁnancial feasibility of the
project (World Commission on Dams, 2000). The varied risks of im-
poverishment faced by people being resettled are signiﬁcant (Cernea,
1997; de Wet, 2001; Scudder, 2005). Usually, a national legal system
has established procedures and compensation mechanisms, however,
too often these are inadequate for assessing the true value of aﬀected
people's assets, such as their land, buildings and crops, and they fail to
avoid harm being created (Hanna et al., 2014; Vanclay, 2017a; van der
Ploeg and Vanclay, 2018). This is especially true in countries where
there is relatively little experience with large infrastructure projects
(Wood, 2003; Ogwang et al., 2018).
Large infrastructure projects are typically ﬁnanced by one or more
of the various international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs), including: the
World Bank (WB); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the
Asian Development Bank (ADB); the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD); the European Investment Bank (EIB); the New Development
Bank (NDB); and others. Project implementers borrowing from an IFI
are required to comply with the speciﬁc standards and requirements of
that bank, which are relatively similar, although there are minor dif-
ferences. Furthermore, even where projects are ﬁnanced by commercial
banks, the same basic environmental and social standards tend to be
applied, especially where the bank is a signatory to the Equator
Principles (Vanclay, 2017a). The international standards unequivocally
require that the resettlement should aim at ‘improving or at least re-
storing’ the living conditions of the impacted people. Moreover, it is
encouraged that resettlement projects be treated as development pro-
jects in their own right (Vanclay, 2017a). The World Bank's Operational
Policy (OP) 4.12 (originally dating from 2001, current version 2013),
which had been voluntarily adopted by the Khudoni project developers
— as well as the World Bank's Environmental and Social Standard 5
which replaces OP4.12 – stipulate that resettlement should be under-
taken as a form of sustainable development and that the displaced
people should share in project beneﬁts (World Bank, 2013, 2017). The
international standards have been evolving over time. They are espe-
cially important for projects where national legislation doesn't provide
adequate safeguards to protect the aﬀected population (Smyth and
Vanclay, 2017). The focus in resettlement practice has now shifted to-
wards ensuring improvement in the living conditions of people to be
resettled (and their host communities), rather than accepting that some
people can be losers from a project simply because it is in the national
interest (Perera, 2014; Vanclay, 2017a).
Social legitimacy is also important when considering large infra-
structure projects. Aﬀected communities should have full access to all
relevant information about the project. Where a project entails reset-
tling a few people in order to achieve beneﬁts for the wider public,
aﬀected people will likely see themselves as being sacriﬁced for the
greater good. Although some people might cooperate, a proponent will
need to make a strong case that the positives outweigh the negatives,
not only for the aﬀected people (which would comprise economic le-
gitimacy), but also for the wider public. The IFI standards urge project
proponents to avoid resettlement if at all possible (IFC, 2012; World
Bank, 2013). Where unavoidable, the extent of resettlement and asso-
ciated impacts should be minimized. This emphasises the importance of
thoroughly exploring project alternatives and giving more weight to
alternatives that are acceptable to local inhabitants.
In order for a proponent to pass the legitimacy threshold of the SLO
framework, they must have: established why their project is important
(legal, economic and social legitimacy); clarity about the beneﬁts to
local communities (economic and social legitimacy); and an assessment
demonstrating that the positive impacts clearly outweigh negative im-
pacts (social legitimacy). It also helps to have a recognisable name with
a good reputation, fully adhere to standards that ensure eﬀective sta-
keholder engagement, enact appropriate transparency and account-
ability procedures, and allow time to build relations with communities,
including by having ongoing representatives on the ground and being
active in addressing local community issues, which will likely go be-
yond the narrowly-deﬁned goals and objectives of the project (Esteves
and Vanclay, 2009).
2.2. Credibility
To achieve the approval level from a local community, a proponent
needs to establish its credibility. Credibility is achieved by consistently
providing true, clear and believable information. Three components of
credibility can be identiﬁed – public perceptions of: (1) the company's
commitment to social performance; (2) the level of technical compe-
tence the company has to deliver on promises made; and (3) the com-
pany's understanding of and respect for the local context (Wilson,
2016).
The ﬁrst component of credibility, the project's commitment to so-
cial performance, was strongly emphasized in the World Commission
on Dams (2000) report. The WCD was established in 1998 to address
escalating controversies surrounding large dams. The WCD report
concluded that dams are important for development, but also that the
many negative impacts imposed on local populations could and should
be avoided. The report outlined seven strategic priorities for dam pro-
ponents and dam governance: (1) gaining public acceptance; (2) un-
dertaking a comprehensive options assessment; (3) addressing existing
dams; (4) sustaining rivers and livelihoods; (5) recognising entitlements
and sharing beneﬁts; (6) ensuring compliance; and (7) sharing rivers for
peace, development and security (World Commission on Dams, 2000).
The importance of commitment to social performance was also em-
phasized in Scudder's (2005) analysis of 50 large dam projects involving
resettlement. Scudder argued that a failure to provide real opportunities
to improve living standards and insuﬃcient funding were signiﬁcant
factors leading to the impoverishment of resettled communities.
The second component of credibility, the project's technical ex-
pertise, is also widely discussed in the literature on dam-induced dis-
placement and resettlement. The seven strategic priorities of the WCD
(World Commission on Dams, 2000) underscore the importance of
technical expertise – e.g. the second principle urges better management
of existing dams before constructing new dams, and the sixth principle
calls for ensuring compliance with commitments made at project
commencement. Without adequate technical expertise, it can be diﬃ-
cult for projects to fulﬁl the commitments and promises made. Reset-
tlement is problematic because it is highly complex and rarely planned
well (Turton, 2006; Reddy et al., 2015; Owen and Kemp, 2016;
Vanclay, 2017a). Restoring, let alone improving, pre-resettlement
conditions is typically more diﬃcult than anticipated (Scudder, 2005;
Mathur, 2006; Price, 2009; Satiroglu and Choi, 2015; Hanna et al.,
2016b; van der Ploeg and Vanclay, 2018). The impoverishment arising
from project-induced resettlement highlights the lack of resettlement
expertise and experience amongst project staﬀ and the lack of political
will by governments and project authorities to follow through on re-
settlement plans and promises.
The third component of credibility is the extent of the project's
understanding of and respect for the local context. IFI standards and the
academic literature emphasise the importance of meaningful public
participation and involving local representatives in decision-making
processes (Scudder, 2005; IFC, 2009, 2012; World Bank, 2013; World
Bank Inspection Panel, 2016; Smyth and Vanclay, 2017). Moreover,
when designing compensation schemes, the objective should be not
only full restoration of material conditions, but also to take into account
the non-material, social dynamics (Scudder, 2005; Reddy et al., 2015;
Terminski, 2015; Smyth and Vanclay, 2017). The places to which
people will be relocated should be adequate, not only in terms of in-
frastructure, economic opportunities and environment, but also in
terms of strengthening social capital (Vanclay, 2017a; van der Ploeg
et al., 2017). Given the high risks to basic human rights during reset-
tlement, van der Ploeg and Vanclay (2017a, 2017b) outline a human
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rights based approach to resettlement. Project proponents should be
able to demonstrate they are aware of and understand human rights and
how to respect them (United Nations, 2007, 2011). It is especially im-
portant to protect Indigenous peoples, vulnerable groups and other
subgroups whose identities and aspirations may be distinct from
mainstream society (World Bank, 2017). International standards have
been giving increasing attention to such groups, especially with the
concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) (Hanna and
Vanclay, 2013; Rodhouse and Vanclay, 2016).
In short, to gain credibility, project proponents must be clear from
the beginning about what is going to happen, how it will aﬀect the local
community, and what mitigation measures, including development
opportunities, will be implemented to understand and address the is-
sues created by the project. The local population must be involved at all
project stages. The proponent must clearly demonstrate understanding
and respect towards local culture and local people.
2.3. Trust (trustworthiness)
What Thomson and Boutilier (2011) call trust, but by being a
property of a project or company perhaps could be considered as
trustworthiness, leads to the highest level of SLO, psychological iden-
tiﬁcation (or co-ownership as it was previously labelled). In order for
trust/trustworthiness to occur, there has to be a long-term relationship
in which local communities and the project proponent consider each
other as partners. Trustworthiness will not arise if there is not a high
degree of legitimacy and credibility. Trust is developed through the
quality of interaction between proponent and local communities, rather
than the quantity of interaction (Moﬀat and Zhang, 2014). Un-
fortunately, proponents often rely only on public meetings for their
community engagement, even though these events are of limited value
(Hartz-Karp and Pope, 2011). Genuine trust building requires (amongst
other things) that representatives of the local communities be actively
involved in decision-making and monitoring (Dare et al., 2014). Where
there is trust, the local community and proponent will consider them-
selves to be on the same side. This perception of being on the same side
is especially important for large dam projects, where often hundreds of
families have to be resettled. Because of the uncertainty about how
families will cope with their new life, and increasing evidence that
resettled families end up worse oﬀ (Vanclay, 2017a), there needs to be a
high level of trust at the commencement of the project, otherwise even
minor issues will create nuisance, annoyance, and increase the risk of
social impacts, leading to protest and disruption (Tilt et al., 2009;
Hanna et al., 2016a).
The development of trust requires understanding and acknowl-
edging that there are diﬀerent groups in a community, and addressing
their diﬀering concerns and interests. Thus, a proponent should not
simply seek one universal SLO, rather they need to accommodate the
diverse views of the multiple groups (Vanclay, 2012; Dare et al., 2014;
Jijelava and Vanclay, 2014b). Particular attention has to be paid to
vulnerable groups in local communities, such as people with dis-
abilities, elderly and women, and Indigenous peoples (van der Ploeg
and Vanclay, 2017b).
Trust is hard to obtain and once damaged it is even harder to re-
build. In the case of Hydro-Quebec in Canada, it took more than
30 years to establish adequate relations with the Indigenous Cree peo-
ples, who had traditionally been living where a HPP was planned
(Papillon and Rodon, 2017). In the 1970s, the relationship was so poor
that some Cree community members swore never to allow the con-
struction of the HPP, and there were numerous protests and conﬂicts
with Hydro-Quebec (Niezen, 2016). Hydro-Quebec had to demonstrate
they could genuinely listen and work with local communities, and that
they were willing to include community representatives in real deci-
sion-making processes allowing the communities to have a strong say
on company plans and activities. Moreover, Hydro-Quebec had to treat
the Cree as partners, implementing a beneﬁt-sharing program with a
percentage share of proﬁt going to the Cree, and enabling them to
substantially beneﬁt from the project by providing training and work
programs (Grand Council of the Crees, 2013). Over time, rather than
posing a risk, the project became associated not only with development
and prosperity, but also with respect for Cree culture and traditional
ways of living, and with enabling the Cree to ﬂourish into the future.
3. Methods used to study the KHUDONI hydroelectric power plant
project
To test the SLO model provided by Thomson and Boutilier, we
considered the Khudoni HPP in Georgia. Using the Thomson and
Boutilier model as our analytical framework, we used a case study
methodology (Tellis, 1997) in a manner similar to which it is typically
applied in social impact assessment research (Becker, 1997; Taylor
et al., 2004). Speciﬁc social research methods used included document
analysis, in-depth interviews with key informants, and an analysis of
information about the case in the various forms of mass media (news-
papers, TV and internet). The social research concept of triangulation
was applied (Becker, 1997).
For the document analysis, we analysed all publicly-available ma-
terials relating to the Khudoni HPP, including the Environmental and
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), a scoping document, various NGO
statements and reports, and a review of the ESIA by the Netherlands
Commission on Environmental Assessment (NCEA, 2013). Un-
fortunately, the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was not publicly
available. Most of these key documents were in English.
The lead author conducted interviews in the Georgian language
with key stakeholders. Interviews with Tbilisi-based stakeholders were
conducted in 2016 and 2017, including with the authors of the ESIA
and the RAP, representatives of the project developer, the Georgian
Ministry of Energy, the Georgian Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources, and watchdog NGOs – Green Alternative and the Caucasus
Environmental NGO Network (CENN). The speciﬁc interviewees were
selected by identifying the key stakeholder groups and then de-
termining which representative(s) in each group were most appropriate
and/or knowledgeable about the project. The main objective of the
interviews was to gain a comprehensive understanding of the history
and current situation, as well as an assessment of the attitudes of the
advocates and opponents of the project. The interviews clariﬁed and/or
validated the information which had been collected from project
documents and the internet. Consistent with SIA methodology (Baines
et al., 2013), given the conﬂict context of this particular project, it was
not appropriate to record interviews, and therefore extensive notes
were taken (in Georgian language) during the interviews. We used a
narrative analysis approach (Ezzy, 2002) for analysing the data. Inter-
view and observation notes were sorted based on their relation to the
topic and reﬂected upon in the context of SLO. The analysis was done in
Georgian, but some key points were translated in English for the paper.
An interview with the Dutch author of the NCEA review was done in
English via skype in October 2017.
In April 2017, the lead author visited New Khaishi in Southern
Georgia, the place to which some aﬀected people were resettled to
during the 1980s. A snowball process was used to identify those people
who had been resettled there. In 2017, only about 20 people from the
80 households who had been resettled remained in New Khaishi, with
the other people who had been resettled having relocated back to their
original home. Five people agreed to talk about the project and their
personal experiences. In July 2017, the lead author visited the original
Khaishi village in Svaneti region, where the Khudoni HPP was supposed
to be constructed. Discussions with local residents led to an in-depth
interview with a local government representative. He provided in-
formation about the project and the views of the local population, and
took the lead author on a tour of signiﬁcant sites, including the local
church, cemetery and a nearby hill overlooking the construction site
and area at risk of inundation. Extensive handwritten ﬁeldnotes were
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made during these visits.
Interviewees preferred not to sign consent sheets, primarily because
of the politically-charged context of the project, but also because there
was not a cultural understanding of these forms and a dislike of bu-
reaucratic procedure. In contested project situations, there is frequently
a reluctance of people to sign documents (Baines et al., 2013). Never-
theless, although the use of signed consent sheets was not appropriate
in this context, the general principle of informed consent and other
ethical social research principles were observed (Vanclay et al., 2013).
We also watched and analysed numerous TV programs and news
stories about the project, especially those which included interviews
with the local population. Most of these programs were recorded be-
tween 2012 and 2013, when the protest peaked. A key source was the
Georgian Public Broadcaster's program, Realuri Sivrtse (Real Space),
which took the form of a critical discussion between interested stake-
holders, including academics, government representatives, NGO
spokespersons, and experts (GPB, 2013). The heated arguments and
rebuttals revealed the positions of the various stakeholders. Another
video (available on YouTube) was a story produced by students of the
Georgian Institute of Public Aﬀairs (GIPA, 2012). It was useful for un-
derstanding the local context and hearing the views of the local po-
pulation.
At various times in 2016 and 2017, we did internet searches using
the Georgian and English words for ‘Khudoni’, ‘Khaishi’, ‘protests in
Svaneti’, ‘hydroelectric power plant in Svaneti’ and other relevant
terms. This resulted in many postings being identiﬁed, mostly dated
between 2012 and 2013 when dam construction was intended to
commence and when the local population organised a number of pro-
test rallies. We reviewed these online stories recording the key points.
This yielded an understanding of how the Khudoni HPP has been re-
ported in the Georgian media, and an indication of broader perceptions
and opinions about it.
4. Background information about the KHUDONI hydroelectric
power plant project
4.1. Technical details about the project
The Khudoni HPP was intended to be located on the Enguri River
near the village of Khaishi in the upper Svaneti region of north-west
Georgia (see Fig. 2). It was originally intended to have a 200m high
dam wall, with a maximum generation capacity of 700MW, and an
annual generation of 1500 million kWh. The reservoir was expected to
contain 345 million cubic metres of water, having a surface area of
528 ha.
The Enguri River already had a large HPP (the 1100MW Enguri
HPP) downstream from the Khudoni site, which was constructed by the
Soviet Union during the 1950s. At that time, additional HPPs were
planned to fully utilize the river's hydropower potential. In 1978, the
Soviet authorities decided to proceed with building the Khudoni HPP.
During the 1980s, the Soviet government built a new settlement (which
was also called Khaishi) in southern Georgia (about 500 kms away) and
started to resettle people out of Khaishi. When the Soviet Union col-
lapsed in 1991, about 80 of the 200 households in Khaishi had been
moved.
In the 10 years following independence in 1991, Georgia had to deal
with several wars, severe economic problems, and internal displace-
ment issues (Mitchell, 2009; Wheatley, 2017). This upheaval meant
that work on the Khudoni HPP stopped, without any measures being
taken to protect work done to date. Thus, within a few years, the
construction work done by the Soviet government on various buildings,
river diversion and other tunnels, the coﬀerdam, the underground
powerhouse, and the left abutment, all fell into disrepair (NCEA, 2013).
The 80 households who had been resettled found it diﬃcult to remain
in the new village, since promised infrastructure had not been com-
pleted and essential services were lacking. Some 50 households re-
turned to their original houses in Khaishi. Many just abandoned the
houses provided to them by the Soviet government, although a few
managed to sell the houses for small amounts mostly to Internally
Displaced Persons who had ﬂed the Abkhazia war.
When the Saakashvili government came to power in Georgia fol-
lowing the Rose Revolution in 2003, talks about the Khudoni HPP re-
sumed. The Saakashvili government implemented radical reforms to
secure swift economic development and to make Georgia attractive for
foreign investment. It viewed energy as an essential component of this
strategy and thought that recommencement of the Khudoni project
could be easily achieved. According to a CEE Bankwatch Network
(2015) factsheet on the dam, the Government of Georgia signed a MoU
to initiate the project in 2007 with Continental Energy Limited (which
later became Trans Electrica), a company ﬁrst registered in 2006 in
Belize. The unclear ownership structure of this and other companies
associated with this project has led to many concerns from watchdog
organisations, especially because it is not easy to identify the in-
dividuals involved and thus ensure transparency and accountability
(CEE Bankwatch Network, 2015).
Between 2005 and 2007, the USAID and the World Bank funded
Fig. 2. Map of Georgia with the original Khaishi village and relocation site marked by red crosses. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Source: Adapted from Wikipedia.
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various consultancy studies to assess the technical, economic, en-
vironmental and social feasibility of the Khudoni HPP. Their reports
had mixed conclusions, suggesting that the project could be feasible,
but indicating that there were many issues to address. In 2009, a further
agreement between the government and the proponent articulated the
precise terms of the project, including that it would be on a Build-Own-
Operate basis, and that the proponent would be required to make
staged payments to the Government of Georgia totalling nearly USD 4
million. It was estimated that the project would cost the proponent in
the vicinity of USD 700 million and would take 60months to construct.
In 2011, the government signed an agreement with a consortium in-
volving Trans Electrica International (formerly Continental Energy
International Limited), Trans Electrica Georgia Limited, and a range of
other parties. During 2012 and 2013, there was much protest against
the project at local and national levels, and a national debate about the
dam and related issues raged in the media (GIPA, 2012; GPB, 2013).
With the change in government in October 2012 (to the Ivanishvili
government), leading to a massive change in policy, there was a rela-
tively-immediate moratorium imposed on the project, with an agree-
ment on the pause signed with the proponent on 4 February 2013.
However, despite the public protest, on 28 May 2013 the new Gov-
ernment approved the project on the same terms agreed to by the
previous government (CEE Bankwatch Network, 2015) and public
statements reconﬁrming Trans Electrica as the authorised developer
were issued to signal the government's intention to persist with the
dam. As at the time of completion of this paper (early 2018), no further
developments on this project have occurred.
4.2. The social context
Svaneti is a mountainous region of Georgia primarily inhabited by
the Svan people, who have a distinct culture and tradition, and argu-
ably qualify as being Indigenous, although this is highly complex in the
Georgian context. The region is highly attractive, with much tourism
potential. With 200 households, the village of Khaishi is a relatively
large village and serves as the regional centre. It has a small hospital,
school, and shops. Altogether, there are 14 settlements in the project
area. If the project is to proceed, four villages – Khaishi, Gagma Khaishi,
Dakari and Tobari – and some households at lower elevations of other
villages would need to be resettled. Of particular concern is the village
church and cemetery in Khaishi. At the time of our research (2017), the
resettlement destination(s) were yet to be decided, although as the
project is currently not likely to proceed in the short term, this is in-
consequential. However, it was a major concern for the villagers pre-
viously, because of the uncertainty around their future.
Local people are very uncertain about their own future and the fu-
ture of their villages. Talk about the project and stop-start actions have
been going on for over 40 years, and it has never been clear what would
happen in the future. Such uncertainty severely aﬀects the life and
wellbeing of local inhabitants and the community. For example, busi-
nesses are less inclined to invest or expand, and households refrain from
making repairs, renovation or expansion. As a result, a cumulative so-
cial impact is that the region is now much less developed than it would
have been if no project had been foreshadowed (Vanclay, 2002, 2012).
5. Examining the social LICENCE to operate of the KHUDONI
hydroelectric power plant
5.1. Examining the project's legitimacy
To understand the legitimacy aspect of the project's SLO, we explore
three overarching issues. First, we assess whether the project's ad-
vocates and champions (including the government) presented an ade-
quate social business case for the project: did they demonstrate that it
was really necessary to build this HPP?; did they establish that the
beneﬁts outweighed the costs at the local and national levels?; and did
they clarify how the project ﬁts into the overall development of
Georgia's energy policy and the future of the Svaneti region? Second,
we explore whether the proponent considered possible alternatives to
the project through the following questions: would a smaller dam have
been better?; would a diﬀerent location have been possible?; would
other sources of energy (e.g. windpower) have been more appropriate
for Georgia? Third, we consider the process dimensions of the project:
were people adequately informed and engaged in the project?
Statements from local NGOs (GYLA, 2013), international actors
(NCEA, 2013), and the numerous protests from the local community
clearly reveal that the legitimacy of the project was being questioned.
There were no convincing answers to the key questions: is this project
necessary?; and who will beneﬁt from the project? Opponents to the pro-
ject often pointed out that the electricity generated would be sold to
Turkey where energy demand was increasing rapidly. They considered
that, while this might enable the private investor to earn signiﬁcant
income, it would not bring any beneﬁts to the local population or even
to Georgia as a whole (Kochladze and Getiashvili, 2007; interviews with
local population). According to Section 5.3 of the 2011 implementation
agreement between Trans Electrica and the Government of Georgia,
electricity generated during winter months would exclusively be for
meeting internal demand in Georgia (Government of Georgia, 2011).
This was not changed by the 2013 MoU. In the summer months when
there would be excess electricity in the Georgian grid, the surplus could
be exported to Turkey (interview with Kochladze and Getiashvili,
2007). However, the Deputy Minister of Energy, Ilia Eloshvili, stated in
a 2014 interview that the government would renegotiate the deal so
that all electricity would be ﬁrst available to Georgian consumers and
only any surplus could be sold to foreign markets (Netgazeti Online
Newspaper, 2014). Nevertheless, the majority of the local population
were not convinced that the beneﬁts of the project outweighed the
negative impacts for Svaneti or Georgia as a whole (GIPA, 2012; in-
terviews with local population). Thus, while there has been some at-
tempt at justiﬁcation by the proponent, the arguments were not con-
vincing to the local population.
Another contested issue relates to whether alternatives to a large
dam were considered and whether the adverse impacts on people,
especially displacement and resettlement, could be avoided or mini-
mized. The NCEA (2013) report considered that the ESIA was seriously
ﬂawed given its limited discussion of alternatives. A key re-
commendation of the NCEA report was for the Georgian government to
undertake a strategic environmental assessment of the energy sector in
Georgia. It argued that understanding the bigger picture and con-
sidering a wider range of alternatives for national energy development
would allow the government to make better decisions and have a more
meaningful and open discussion with the public. The suggestion to
conduct a Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment of the energy
sector was implemented in 2014 as part of a World Bank loan to
strengthen the country's energy system. However, at the time of com-
pletion of this paper (early 2018), the report had not yet been released.
One argument against the project used by the local population was
that, if they were forced to leave their homes, other places in Svaneti
would also become subject to further dam construction, leading to the
desertion, despoliation and desolation of this historic and beautiful
mountainous region. For the Svan people with their distinctive cultural
identity and language, this was highly signiﬁcant. For them, leaving the
region would mean betraying their culture, history and tradition, which
was seen as more important than all other issues associated with re-
settlement. Their struggle to stop the Khudoni Dam was seen as a last
bastion fending-oﬀ potential other HPP construction projects in the
region: ‘if we concede now, it will mean that the whole Svaneti region
will be lost’ (interview with a local resident; also see GIPA, 2012). If the
legitimacy level of SLO is to be achieved, future plans will need to be
clearly explained to the local population, and their concerns about the
future of the region will need to be addressed.
The legitimacy issue was exacerbated by the inadequacy of the
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information provided by the proponent. The NCEA (2013: 8) report
stated that ‘the communication with potentially aﬀected people of the
Khaishi community as well as the inhabitants of the upper Svaneti re-
gion has been incomplete and not transparent. Flaws in procedures for
resettlement planning and lack of information has resulted in sig-
niﬁcant distrust of the population in government and investor’. Public
meetings about the project were poorly advertised, especially at the
early stages of the project. According to one NGO report, only in-
habitants from 2 of the 17 villages knew about the public hearing in
2007 (Kochladze and Getiashvili, 2007; CEE Bankwatch Network,
2014). The company had a part-time representative in Khaishi during
the project preparation phase, but no serious eﬀort was made to es-
tablish a genuine community engagement program. The proponent did
upload the ESIA and other relevant documents to their website, but
these documents were not widely accessed because most local people
did not have internet access. Furthermore, these documents were not
user-friendly, easy-to-read documents that most people could compre-
hend.
The quality of the public consultations has raised concerns. One
journalist (cited by Antidze, 2013: 50) said: although ‘the purpose of
such meetings should be the public's involvement in the decision-
making process, the company stated from the very beginning that all
the decisions had already been made. In particular, they highlighted
that the ﬁnal design of the project was already selected and construc-
tion activities would start in April, 2012. How can anybody claim that
the meeting running under this format is consultation with public?’.
Other people interviewed by Antidze (2013) emphasized that the public
hearings were solely top-down information provision, without any
meaningful consultation or participatory engagement. This was a cri-
tical issue because participation in decision making is very important
for the people of Upper Svaneti (Elizbarashvili et al., 2018).
When a project is implemented by a well-known company with an
established record of successfully implementing similar projects else-
where, people will likely think that its legitimacy is higher than a
project run by an unknown or dodgy organisation. For example, BP,
which has a relatively good reputation in Georgia (Jijelava and
Vanclay, 2017), enjoyed some level of SLO from the commencement of
their activities because people had a fairly clear idea about BP, its ac-
tivities and reputation. Trans Electrica, however, was a diﬀerent story,
and its unclear ownership status raised many questions. Furthermore, it
was perceived as having no experience in running similar projects. In a
July 2015 brieﬁng by a local NGO, some of the key concerns included
the fact that the contracting company was registered oﬀshore (British
Virgin Islands), and the names of the owners and sources of ﬁnancing
had not been disclosed (Green Alternative, 2015).
5.2. Examining the project's credibility
Credibility in the SLO context means the perception of the local
community about the company's fairness, transparency, and under-
standing of the local context. The proponent should clearly demonstrate
its commitment to social performance. According to most people in
Georgia and the assessments of local NGOs and the NCEA, there was
little perception of fairness or transparency from the beginning of the
Khudoni project. The mistrust became so great that when the asset
valuers arrived as part of the resettlement process, they were hindered
in their job by the local people. The ESIA, a document that is supposed
to examine all social and environmental impacts, only partially ad-
dressed the social issues. For example, it omitted any discussion of in-
formal economic activity (e.g. logging), an important livelihood activity
for many people in the region. Furthermore, the ESIA did not ade-
quately distinguish between the various impacts to be experienced by
the diﬀerent groups of people within the aﬀected population (NCEA,
2013). Finally, because many people in the community do not use the
internet regularly, access to the ESIA was limited.
In big projects, grievance redress mechanisms tend to be established
only when land acquisition starts, although good practice expects that
they be established from the very beginning of a project (Vanclay et al.,
2015). Having a grievance mechanism and addressing the speciﬁc
needs of the local community would help proponents demonstrate
fairness and transparency. However, in the Khudoni case, this did not
happen, leading to doubts about fairness and transparency.
Commitment to social performance should be demonstrated by a
good understanding of the local context. Although the Khudoni ESIA to
some extent did consider site alternatives and how a signiﬁcant cultural
heritage site might be protected, it did not give adequate consideration
to what was important to the local communities. In traditional Georgian
villages, the church and cemetery are considered highly signiﬁcant by
local people, even though these sites do not qualify as heritage in na-
tional or international terms. If the dam is to proceed, for local people
to approve the project, serious eﬀort will need to be given to this issue.
In resettlement practice worldwide, it is quite common that cemeteries
and churches are relocated (Reddy et al., 2015).
Understanding the past experience of the local community is im-
portant. When the Soviet Union started to develop the dam in the
1980s, about a third of the people of Khaishi were resettled to the
Southern part of Georgia, to a location that was culturally, ethnically
and geographically very diﬀerent. Basic services, including potable
water, were not provided, making it diﬃcult for the resettled people to
get by. When the Soviet Union started to collapse and various large
infrastructure projects under construction, including Khudoni HPP,
were stopped irrespective of their state of completion, most people who
had been resettled decided to go back to their original villages. Only
about a quarter of the 80 households resettled for the Khudoni HPP
remained in the new settlement. The rest sold their houses or aban-
doned them. This means that there is a risk of double-resettlement for
signiﬁcant proportion of the Khaishi population, which would be highly
stressful for them.
The second dimension of credibility is demonstrating a high level of
technical skill. This was problematic for the Khudoni project, with
weaknesses revealed in many ways, at least from the community's
perspective. From a social perspective, perhaps the most important
information is the number of households to be relocated. However, this
is not always easy to establish, and changes to project speciﬁcations
may lead to changes in the number of people to be resettled (Reddy
et al., 2015; van der Ploeg and Vanclay, 2018). However, from the
community perspective, the varying numbers of people and households
to be resettled between diﬀerent documents did not give a sense of the
project having credibility. This was exacerbated by awareness that the
company did not have a record of developing similar projects elsewhere
and that the government had not previously supervised such a large
construction project. Such inexperience on all matters led to the local
population having fears that, irrespective of any promises made, they
could not be sure the promises would or could be kept.
5.3. Examining the project's trust
For trust to occur, a long-term relationship needs to be developed in
which each side views itself and the other party as being part of the
same team and a joint partner in the project. This means more than
simply allowing the local population to participate in meetings, it re-
quires enabling them to take part in decision-making. There was no
attempt by the proponent to involve the Svan people. For trust to
emerge, the relationship needs to be ongoing and long-term. Interacting
with the local community only on an ad hoc basis to deal strictly with
issues of conﬂict does not establish trust. A trusting relationship re-
quires the proponent to demonstrate real commitment to the local
community. Among other things, this could include opening a local
oﬃce with local staﬀ who are known and respected in the community.
Another aspect of gaining trust is that the engagement activities
need to be tailored to the needs of the diﬀerent stakeholder groups. It is
never the case that there is just one SLO a company needs to obtain
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from a single homogenous community, rather a SLO for each stake-
holder group needs to be gained (Dare et al., 2014; Jijelava and
Vanclay, 2014b; Vanclay, 2012). It takes time and eﬀort to identify all
the diﬀerent groups and to work with each of them to gain their trust.
This is especially the case with disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
According to the NCEA assessment, the ESIA did not diﬀerentiate the
aﬀected people according to the degree of impact from the project.
Most ESIA data were collected from secondary sources at a municipality
rather than village level, so it missed many details about agriculture,
tourism, forestry, ecosystem services, and water use (NCEA, 2013).
One issue of great concern to the local community was that the
government allegedly sold 1500 ha of land to the company for one
dollar. This was to enable the company to progress building the dam
and associated activities. Although this was part of a bigger ﬁnancing
arrangement, with the company paying the government a total of 4
million dollars, local people were not aware of the bigger picture and
presumed foul play when it was reported the land had been sold for a
pittance. They also felt they had not been consulted on this arrange-
ment, and they were especially concerned because they had not even
approved of the dam. Furthermore, the land parcels in question had
contested tenure, with some local people having used portions of this
land for generations, thus having a feeling they had ownership or use
entitlements, if not actual rights. When this land was taken away from
them and given to the company, they felt cheated.
From the start of the project, the narrative from the government and
proponent was not that everybody was on the same side, rather that the
project was essential for national development and therefore anybody
who was against the project was opposing the idea of a strong, uniﬁed
and independent Georgia. Some project advocates claimed that the vast
majority of people knew the project was for the common good and that
the subversive activities of the environmental NGOs undermined the
project and the country.
6. Conclusion
Two main topics were considered in this research. First, why did the
Khudoni hydroelectric power plant project fail to obtain a social licence
to operate and what can be learned from this? Second, overall, is SLO,
especially as conceived by Thomson and Boutilier (2011), a useful
concept to apply to dam projects and other large projects in general?
Regarding the ﬁrst question, it was evident that the legitimacy of
the Khudoni HPP was never achieved. The need for the project was not
properly established, especially from the perspective of the aﬀected
people. Although the government argued the project was important for
the country's economy and for energy independence, the government
failed to convince the aﬀected communities and other stakeholders of
this. To most people – not only in Svaneti but all across Georgia, as
evidenced by the extent of protest against the project – the govern-
ment's plans to ﬂood large parts of Svaneti and demand that most
people leave the region were manifestly not acceptable. Furthermore,
the government appeared to be unwilling to discuss alternatives to a
large dam or to publicly justify its decisions. Finally, people felt ex-
cluded from decision making processes and had to resort to radical
forms of protest in order to have their points of view seriously con-
sidered. One rather unusual form of protest involved reviving an an-
cient religious tradition of swearing an oath to protect the region on an
icon of St George (Voell, 2013).
Credibility was also problematic. With Trans Electrica being an
unknown, obscure, opaque, foreign-registered company without any
established record did not bolster the credibility of the project. Mention
of the World Bank's OP4.12 did not assuage concerns about the tech-
nical capacity of the operator to implement a resettlement process even
if people were to agree to be relocated. The mistrust was further ex-
acerbated by the 40-year experience the community had with plans for
a dam. Furthermore, once the agreement between the government and
the company was signed, there seemed to be little interest by the
company in community engagement and no room for meaningful ne-
gotiation with the aﬀected community. To enhance their credibility,
project proponents must clearly demonstrate they are willing to and
capable of adhering to internationally accepted standards.
Trust is the most diﬃcult of the three levels of SLO, and can only be
achieved over time. When past experience and initial positions are
tense, taking shortcuts in engagement processes will almost certainly
lead to failure, as happened with Khudoni HPP. Insuﬃcient or in-
appropriate forms of communication, e.g. not opening an oﬃce in the
aﬀected region, will retard credibility and trust. Moving forward, rather
than just paying meagre compensation, much more eﬀort needs to be
made to demonstrate that resettlement can be an opportunity for de-
velopment for local people as well as for the nation, and that displaced
people will experience enhancement in their livelihoods and wellbeing.
The government and/or proponent should start investing in Svaneti and
in the region where people will be resettled, and attempt to demon-
strate that the project will bring beneﬁts rather than contribute to de-
spoliation and desolation.
Regarding the second question, we believe that social licence to
operate is a useful concept in a conceptual and practical sense. We
consider that the Thomson and Boutilier (2011) way of understanding
SLO is very eﬀective and can be applied empirically to test whether a
speciﬁc project has a SLO. We consider that the Thomson and Boutilier
(2011) model should, or at least could, form the basis of a common
understanding of the SLO discourse. We demonstrated that for all
projects, especially large dams involving resettlement, it is essential for
the project to be guided by the elements underpinning the SLO fra-
mework: legitimacy, credibility and trust. Project staﬀ should apply the
understandings associated with gaining legitimacy, credibility and trust
to each phase of a project, to all project activities, and to all community
engagements activities and communications emanating from a project.
Gaining a strong social licence will usually take many years, but at-
tempting to advance a project without local support will be proble-
matic, not only for the aﬀected communities, but also for the proponent
and other project advocates in the medium to long term as the negative
reputation they will gain will make it harder for them to develop new
projects in future. Even if a project is eventually pushed through, there
will be project delays, costs will be increased, and harm will be created
(Langbroek and Vanclay, 2012). In that sense, SLO can be conceived as
being a social licence to operate and grow. Thus, there is a strong business
case for why companies should take the concept seriously.
7. Postscript
As at 2018, ﬁve years after the project was halted, no major changes
have occurred. The company still runs a small oﬃce in Tbilisi, the ca-
pital of Georgia, and states that the HPP will be built, at least even-
tually. The government has also stated on a number of occasions that
the Khudoni HPP project is very important for Georgia and that it will
be built. The government has also announced that it might sever ties
with Trans Electrica and build the dam by itself. However, no action has
been taken in relation to these pronouncements. With the demand for
and price of electricity dropping in Turkey (where most of Khudoni's
excess electricity would have been sold) and several other HPPs being
built across Georgia, the justiﬁcation for the Khudoni project is even
less convincing. Meanwhile, the Khaishi community still lives in limbo,
but probably expects that someday the debate about the Khudoni HPP
project will resurface – only, next time, they know the local community
will lose out.
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